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This paper examines ongoing efforts to establish a new semi-state, commercial water utility in Ireland.
The new utility, Irish Water, marks a significant break with the previous public service model of water
and wastewater provision both in terms of how it is financed and how it is governed. The Irish gov-
ernment asserts that these reforms are a necessary response to the twin challenges of an aging water
infrastructure and the fiscal challenges of the Irish state. In this paper I outline how the convergence of
these environmental and financial demands are provoking new advances in the neoliberalization of
water services. I argue that the organizational and technical composition of Irish Water suggests the
extension of both financial logics and highly technical environmental metrics into the water sector, what
I call the process of bio-financialization.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.In this light, we might hope that leading governments will help
finance capital realize its profound potential to remake the ar-
teries through which capital flows and that are the lifeblood of
the biological and social reproduction of most of contemporary
humanity (Castree and Christophers, 2015: 8).
1. Introduction
On the 2nd February 2015, live on the national evening news,
Ireland's Minster for the Environment, Alan Kelly, made it clear why
householdwater chargeswere being introduced andwhy therewas
a need to establish a new water utility called Irish Water. Up until
this point the government had been keen to stress that water
charges were both necessary to incentivize water conservation and
to finance critical upgrades of an aging water infrastructure. Alan
Kelly went a step further, however. He admitted that the newwater
utility was established not only to charge for water use but also to
take the financing of water services off the general exchequer
balance sheet: as an independent, semi-state company, Irish Water
would be able to borrow directly from international credit markets.
While this was a significant admission it has not received much
attention from the media, the opposition parties, or even the
considerable, grassroots movement resisting the introduction ofwater charges. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the main points of conten-
tion have been the regressive nature of the water charges coming
after five years of government austerity policies as well as the
corporate nature of the new utility e controversies over pay-
bonuses, high salaries for the executives and the general unac-
countability that surrounds the new utility have all been targeted
by opponents. The movement against the water charges has also
connected with water justice movements around the world,
adopting familiar slogans that claim water as a human right and
oppose the privatization and commodification of water. This
discourse becomes somewhat ambiguous in the case of IrishWater,
which is a state-owned and thus technically public utility. Getting
around this, campaigners have argued that the newmodel of water
provision is just the ‘obvious’ first step towards full privatization
and thus must be resisted.
While these arguments are valid and important they can tend to
be picked up uncritically, assuming that what we are experiencing
is neoliberal ‘business as usual’: market-based institutions replac-
ing what should be a public service. What can be glossed over in
this analysis are the specific forms that neoliberal rationalities take
as the challenges of failing infrastructures and the fiscal crises of
the nation-state unfold within the rapidly changing contexts of the
global economy, ecological uncertainty and supra-national regula-
tory frameworks. In other words, Irish Water does not emerge as a
well-formed neoliberal project implemented by canny policy-
makers with no regard for the public good. It is an experiment
that must be placed within a longer process of failed water service
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possibilities). It is this convergence that opens up new relationships
between the state and the market, the public and the private. This
isn't to suggest that the current re-organization of water services in
Ireland is inevitable but it avoids interpreting it as just another
example of neoliberal ideology being imposed on the population by
governing elites.
Research on the changing political economy and political ecol-
ogy of water provision has been one of the richest sources for
tracing and understanding neoliberal transformations in the pro-
vision of vital services historically associated with the state (Bakker
2003a,b, 2005; Budds & McGranahan; 2003; Kaika, 2003;
Swyngedouw, 1997). From the ‘heyday’ of water privatization in
the 1990s we have witnessed dramatic changes across different
parts of the globe as ‘better’ solutions are sought for the chronic
problems of water shortages and lack of investment. Scholars have
documented the changing accumulation strategies of private
companies involved in different aspects of water services, from
long-term and high-risk agreements (full-ownership or conces-
sion), to shorter operational contracts, to new interventions in the
water cycle such as desalination and environmental management
services (see Bakker, 2013; Hall and Lobina, 2010). As the role of the
private sector in water services has changed so too has the role of
the state: from public-private partnerships that re-distribute the
costs and risks associated with capital infrastructure projects to
new forms of ‘public’ water management, including the turn to-
wards re-municipalization (Pigeon et al. 2012; Schwartz 2008; Van
Rooyen and Hall, 2007). While some argue that this is a positive
‘return’ of the state to the public management of essential services
(Ramesh and Araral 2010), others point to the re-formulation of
neoliberal market practices and logics within state-owned utilities,
effectively challenging any remnant of the public-private binary
that has been one of the hallmarks of ‘anti-neoliberal’ struggles
(McDonald, 2014; Smith 2004, 2006). In other words: while the
‘return’ of the state may reflect the failure of previous arrange-
ments, these failures do not mean the end of neoliberalism. Indeed,
it is the capacity to respond to such failures that characterizes
neoliberal governance, provoking new configurations of the state,
market, society and non-human natures. In this paper, I examine
how new fiscal and environmental demands on the Irish water
sector are generating new financial and technical fixes. I describe
this as the bio-financialization of the water sector because of the
convergence of two dynamics that are rarely analyzed together in
the literature: financialization and ecological modernization.1
While large amounts of finance capital have always been
involved in the production of core, physical infrastructures the
changing and growing role of the finance sector in the shaping of
infrastructure provision indicates that something different is at
stake today (Epstein, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2009). In the case of Irish1 In their article, “The Unintended consequences of ecological modernization:
debt-induced reconfiguration of the water cycle in Barcelona” (2013), March and
Saurí make an important connection between ecological modernization, financi-
alization and the neoliberalization of water services. They show how compliance
with the European Water Directives resulted in considerable costs and debts being
accrued by the Catalan Water Agency during the 2000s. When combined with
European fiscal restrictions introduced through the European Stability Pact (1992),
this situation became unmanageable even before the 2008 financial crisis. The
conclusion of this debt-induced reconfiguration of the Catalan water system was
the almost ‘inevitable’ privatization of the public raw water supplier (ATLL).
However, while the connections March and Saurí make between ecological
modernization, financialization and neoliberalism are important they don‘t suggest,
as I am in this paper, that the connections extend to a growing emphasis on the
measurement and demonstration of environmental and financial performance
across the water system. This tendency has far-reaching consequences in terms of
the organizational and technical composition of the water sector.Water, the goal of accessing capital on financial markets (most
likely through the issuing of bonds) first requires securing a regular
stream of revenue (from household water charges) and then
demonstrating the financial efficiency and regulatory compliance
of the utility to potential investors. The attractiveness of in-
vestments in water infrastructure, particularly for pension funds,
reflects the monopoly nature of water service provision, ensuring
captive income streams with known rates over fixed time periods
(Courtois, 2013). At one level this means that private (financial)
actors can operate atmore of a distance from the daily operations of
the water system itself while still profiting from the provision of
water services through new forms of financial rent. At another level
the apparent distance between the ‘real’ operations of the water
utility and new sources of finance ignores the significant ways in
which access to external private finance is shaping the organization
and management of water systems ‘on the ground’. In order to be
assured that an infrastructure project is worth investing in an
investor needs to be confident that the project is low-risk and will
return a good yield on their investment as compared to other po-
tential investments. This means that the infrastructure project itself
must be translated into the legible terms of financial investors - in
terms of efficiency, strong and transparent management and reg-
ulatory compliance (EC Harris 2013; OECD, 2010).2 This has led
scholars of financialization to point to the important organizational
and technical transformations that are required to transform an
activity or resource into a financial asset to begin with
(Christopherson et al. 2013; Leyshon and Thrift 2007).3 As Chris-
topherson et al. write,
Finance has ceased simply to assist the running and operation of
the real economy of goods and services, but rather has come to
dominate, even displace, the latter. Financial rationales and
practices have re-shaped performance metrics not just for enter-
prises across all sectors of the economy but also throughout the
public sector and utilities, including health and social services,
thereby affecting the social well-being and welfare of house-
holds (2013: 351e352; my italics).
What is important to understand in this regard is that the
financialization of water infrastructures is not the same as the
financialization of water resources, as may happen in the way oil or
land has been financialized through futures contracts. Rather it is
the entire network of services and assets involved in the delivery of
water and wastewater treatment that is becoming embroiled
within the contemporary financial environment (Hall and Lobina
2010; Loftus & March 2015; March and Purcell, 2014).
Ecological modernization has a long history as both an academic
concept and a policy framework (Beck, 1994; Warner, 2010; Mol
and Spaargen 2000). Contradicting the gloomy, neo-Malthusian
prognoses of environmental and development economists in the
1960s and 1970s, for example, post-industrial visions of economic
growth posited that the potential for social and economic devel-
opment need not be restrained by natural limits (Cooper 2008).2 As the OECD makes clear, “[i]nfrastructure financing is often seen to be risky,
largely as a result of regulatory risk. Governments therefore also need to find ways to
make infrastructure investment attractive by mitigating these risks without removing
incentives to manage risk” (OECD 71; my italics).
3 While much of the work on the financialization of infrastructure examines
changing ownership patterns in the water sector (Helm and Tindall, 2009) and the
financial engineering that enables various intermediaries to profit from revenue
streams associated with tolls or pay-per-use services (Allen and Pryke, 2013;
Ashton et al. 2012), I am mostly interested in the process through which an
infrastructure becomes a financial asset to begin with; the transformations that are
necessary to turn something like a water system into a financial asset.
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environmental ‘externalities’ of industrial production, but rather
advance beyond this mode of production by properly accounting
for non-human nature within new economic, social and ecological
configurations. At its heart, ecological modernization is driven by
the belief that economic growth is not just compatible with
ecological sustainability but inextricably connected to it through
technological innovation and market incentives. In terms of the
ecological modernization of the hydro-social cycle, this means
designing and implementing appropriate policies, techniques and
technologies that enable more efficient water-use (and increasingly
energy-use) from the household to the national utility. While this
takes the form of new regulations and incentive-based instruments
(user-pays principle), it also demands new ways of measuring
water (and energy) use, water quality and the overall performance
of the infrastructure which harnesses, processes and distributes
water and wastewater. This is opening up new, profitable oppor-
tunities for ICTcompanies in the area of environmental services and
resource management, as well as changing how water systems are
being managed at a domestic and national scale. In this paper I
explore how this emphasis on measuring and regulating the
environmental performance of the water system dovetails with the
need to demonstrate the financial performance of the water utility
for potential investors. This process takes the form of new organi-
zational and technical innovations in the Irish water sector that are
transforming how water and the extensive infrastructure that ac-
companies it are being valued and developed.
The paper proceeds in three steps. First, I briefly describe the
double crises facing the Irish state. On one hand, there is a looming
hydro-ecological crisis that is closely connected to an ageing and
failing water infrastructure that can no longer cater to the changing
demands of Irish society or the new risks and regulatory re-
quirements associated with environmental change. On the other
hand, since 2008 the Irish state has been in the midst of an un-
precedented fiscal crisis that has put tremendous pressure on its
ability to provide basic public services, such as water supply and
treatment. In part two I describe the new semi-state utility, Irish
Water, which has been tasked with responding to this double crisis.
I show how the imperative to access external finance converges
with new environmental demands to ‘modernize’ the water infra-
structure, resulting in the organizational and technical composition
of the new utility. Finally, I conclude by emphasizing the need to
better examine the convergence of financial logics and ecological
modernization; the growing centrality of new technologies and
techniques of measurement in shaping core infrastructures; and
the importance of such analyses in debates and struggles for more
just, participatory and inclusive hydro-social futures.2. The bio-financial crisis of the Irish Water system
2.1. Hydro-social crisis
The Irish water system is in trouble. To begin with an estimated
23,000 people are currently on Boil Water Notices,4 meaning their
water is not fit for drinking due to the risk of microbiological
contamination (Doris et al. 2013). In some areas, people have been
under this notice for several years and do not face the prospect of
relief until 2021 at the earliest. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has identified that wastewater treatment is not at the
required standard in 38 of the larger urban areas and 30% of water4 A boil-water advisory or boil-water order is a public health directive given by
government or health authorities to consumers when a community's drinking
water is, or could be, contaminated by pathogens.treatment plants are considered to be “at risk” of failure in terms of
Irish and European quality parameters. As a result of Ireland's
failure to meet the requirements of the EU Urban Waste Water
Treatment Directive in respect of 71 areas in 2011 the European
Commission has initiated an Infringement Case against the state.
As well as problems with the treatment of water and waste-
water, Ireland also faces problems with water capacity, particularly
for the growing demand in the capital. Overall, 37% of the identified
‘Gateway and Hub’ settlements throughout the country lack ca-
pacity to cater for planned populations in 2016 in terms of water
supply and wastewater infrastructure (PWC 2011). In November
2013, water supply throughout Dublin was cut for several consec-
utive nights because of water shortages, including to commercial
properties e leading to claims by some media commentators that
Ireland was like a ‘third world country’. In March 2015, Irish Water
published a ‘Need Report’ for the proposed Eastern and Midlands
Region Water Supply Project (WSP) that identified projected de-
mand for water in Dublin to increase by over 50% by 2050. On its
website it stated that “[i]mprovements to and maintenance of the
existing water supply system, will not meet that level of need. A
new source must be developed and utilized”.
Existing water shortages have also been connected to reduced
rainfall (related to climate change5) and growing demand on water
resources from the urban population. Besides potential reductions
in rainfall, the other water-related risk associated with climate
change is the prospect of heavy and severe rainfall resulting in
flooding and the escape of raw sewage out of the wastewater sys-
tem. Even leaving aside these unprecedented and unpredictable
risks and pressures from demographic and environmental change,
continuing reliance on a 19th century water infrastructure that has
suffered from chronic under-investment currently results in the
loss of 40% of water in the system through leakage (PWC 2011).
Recently the detection of lead in household drinking water has also
resulted in temporary boil water notices. This lead is dissolved into
the water supply from pipes that were laid pre-1960. The public
water system in Ireland consists of 60,000 km of piping (most of
which is underground) not including the connections between the
mains pipes and household taps. To fix or replace this piping is a
colossal task that clearly requires considerable financial and tech-
nical resources. While the Irish government invested almost V5.2
billion in the water sector between 2000 and 2009 most of this
went towards filling the substantial compliance gap under the
European Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive. Currently
operating costs of water and wastewater services are approxi-
mately V1.2 billion per annum, of which around V1 billion was
historically provided by the Government through taxation, with
other sources, including non-domestic water charges, contributing
just over V200 m. An estimated additional V20 billion investment
in the water system up to 2030, is thought to be necessary (PWC
2011).
While not receiving much attention in either the literature on
water provision in Europe or in the debates surrounding the setting
up of a new utility in Ireland, the role of European regulatory
frameworks in shaping the role, governance structures and, effec-
tively, financing of water utilities has been considerable. In one
sense, European regulations around water use and management
have been progressive. Efforts to account for the negative effects of
pollution, urban expansion and the inefficient use of water5 Successive EPA reports (2009, 2013) on the state of knowledge on climate
change impacts for Ireland, identifies that changing patterns of precipitation will
impact on water services provision and on levels of pollution and contamination,
with significantly wetter winters particularly in the west, and drier summers
particularly in the south east and storm occurrences of a greater intensity.
6 When the EU member states, including Ireland, adopted the Water Framework
Directive in 2000, Ireland secured an exemption or ‘carve-out’, upon which suc-
cessive Governments have relied ever since in order to avoid charging domestic
consumers for water services. Under article 9(1) of the Water Framework Directive,
member states are required to “take account of the principle of recovery of the costs
of water services, including environmental and resource costs, having regard to the
economic analysis conducted according to Annex III of the directive and in accor-
dance in particular with the polluter pays principle.” Article 9(4) of the Directive
includes the ‘carve out’, which has been described as the ‘Irish derogation’ even
though it is not limited in its effect to Ireland. It provides that a member state will
not be in breach of the Directive if it decides e in accordance with established
practices e not to apply the provisions relating to cost recovery “where this does
not compromise the purposes and the achievement of the objectives of this
Directive.”
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Directive (1992), the Drinking Water Directive (1998) and, most
significantly, the Water Framework Directive (2000). These di-
rectives not only place a financial burden onmember states but also
determine the scale and goals of water management (Kaika, 2003;
Petersen et al., 2009; Thiel, 2009). Rather than managing water
resources according to social or political boundaries (municipality,
region etc.), the Water Frameworks Directive (WFD), for example,
calls for an integrated, river basin approach that more closely re-
flects the ecological dimensions of the water cycle. This in turn
requires carrying out holistic baseline data analysis of river basins,
including estimating the social, ecological and economic costs of
different measures based on future population and development
scenarios.
Water management within the EU is no longer just about
maintaining existing infrastructures, but of implementing new
ways of monitoring, assessing and managing more and more as-
pects of the water system in response to projected future de-
velopments and risks (CEC, 2012). In November 2011, the European
Commission wrote to Ireland and nine other member states
warning that they had incorrectly interpreted the concept of ‘water
services’ (Whittaker, 2012). The Commission considers ‘water ser-
vices’ to be amuch broader concept than just the supply of drinking
water and treatment of wastewater for humans. Understood as part
of Europe's ‘natural capital’, water resources provide many func-
tions within the economy and wider ecology that need to be
accounted for (European Environment Agency, 2015). For example,
water services includes the cost of water abstraction for cooling
industrial installations and agricultural irrigation, the impound-
ment or storage of surface waters for navigation purposes, flood
protection, hydro power production, as well as drilling for agri-
cultural, industrial or private consumption. According to the
Commission, the exclusion of these activities from the definition of
water services, and the failure to properly account for and value
these services, is a breach of the provisions of Article 9 of theWater
Framework Directive. This brings with it technological re-
quirements (data monitoring and analysis, environmental services,
more efficient treatment plants) and reforms in water governance
so that state institutions are capable of adapting to these new de-
mands. All of this costs money: full compliance with the Water
Framework Directive has not been properly costed but is likely to
run to several billion euro over the period to 2027 (PWC 2011).
2.2. Financial crisis
In 2007e8, Ireland's economic ‘miracle’ ended when the
property-led bubble burst in the wake of the international financial
collapse. The banks which had been key facilitators of the specu-
lative real-estate economy through high value, risky lending, were
given a blanket guarantee by the government in 2008 worth V64
billion. State finances were crippled by this massive transfer of
public money into the private banking system but also by the sharp
drop in tax revenues from an economy that had been so reliant on
construction and property sales. As the structural weaknesses of
the Irish economy soon became clear, the cost of borrowing on
international markets became prohibitive and the Irish government
was faced with no options in terms of filling the financing gap. In
December 2010, Ireland received V85 billion in bailout funds from
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF.
As has become well known these funds were tied to certain fiscal
conditions and structural reform promises laid out in a new Pro-
gram of Financial Support for Government that was to last until
2014. This program required a V10 billion reduction in annual
government spending and a V5 billion increase in annual tax re-
ceipts. The goal was to bring Ireland back in line with Europeanbudgetary targets laid out in the Stability Pact Agreement of 1992.
The Troika Program also camewith specific conditions related to
the financing of water services. Ireland was already the only
member state not to charge for domestic water use.6 With the bail
out restrictions on government spending and the high costs
required to bring the water system into line with European water
directives it was clear that the Irish state could no longer defend
this situation. The Program of Financial Support for Ireland agreed
between the Government and the EU/IMF required that by the end
of 2011 the Government had to have undertaken an independent
assessment of the transfer of responsibility for water services
provision from the local authorities to a new water utility. In the
Program for National Recovery, 2011e2016, the Government
signaled its intention to create a new State company to take over
water and wastewater functions from the 34 existing local au-
thorities. While Ireland is still in the early stages of this transition it
is important to understand the reasoning behind the decisions that
have been taken so far. Faced with an aging, inadequate water
infrastructure and demanding European water directives at a time
when there are fiscal limitations on what the government can
borrow and spend, the goal of accessing new sources of finance in
order to modernize the water system has become primary. As I will
show in the next section this is not simply a case of raising new
revenue through water charges ewhich would never be enough e
but of establishing a new, independent semi-state water utility that
will be able to borrow directly from global financial markets. At the
same time, the need to attract such investment is bound up with
the ability of the new utility to demonstrate that it is compliant
with environmental regulations and efficient across all aspects of
its operations, including in the management of the underlying
water and infrastructure assets.3. The bio-financial fix: Irish Water
3.1. Off-balance sheet financing: Re-organizing the Irish Water
sector
The relationship between finance capital and the development
of modernwater infrastructures is well known: to harness, process,
distribute and move water and wastewater requires considerable
amounts of money (Budds and McGranahan, 2003; Swyngedouw,
2006). In the twentieth century, the expansion of the industrial
water systems was inextricably tied to the availability of capital,
whether in the form of surplus capital being re-directed into
speculative, interest-bearing investments (Swyngedouw, 1997), or
mediated through financial institutions such as the World Bank
(Bakker, 2013). Indeed, one of the primary justifications for the
increased role of the private sector in the provision of water ser-
vices in the 1990s and 2000s was their assumed ability to access
finance. As early as 2003 this assumption was recognized to be
flawed by the World Bank in its response to the Camdessus/World
P. Bresnihan / Utilities Policy 40 (2016) 115e124 119Panel on FinancingWater Infrastructure: private sector finance had
provided less than 10% of necessary capital, and the declining trend
in private sector investment was likely to continue (Camdessus and
Winpenny, 2003). The limited amounts of private investment in
infrastructure projects became more pronounced in the immediate
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Fine, 2009; Hall, 2009).
The failure of the private sector to invest sufficiently in infra-
structure has opened the door for the state to fulfill that function,
not through general taxation as was the case in the past, but
through new forms of financial engineering that will enable the
raising of ‘market-based repayable finance’ (OECD, 2010; Turner,
2014).7 The question is how can the financial needs of municipal
and national governments be brought together with the interests of
financial investors looking for new activities and assets to invest
in?8 This new field of infrastructure financing now occupies many
pages in the reports and commentaries of policy-makers and
financial experts seeking to bridge the financing gap required to
improve and expand core infrastructure and services (Clark et al.
2012; EC Harris 2013; Inderst, 2009; OECD, 2014; Thompson, 2013).
In the shift towards market-based repayable finance the ques-
tion of private or public ownership takes on yet another twist in the
story of neoliberal transformations. There is no need for a publicly
owned utility to be privatized before it becomes a target for
financial investors.9 As I will show in the case of Irish Water, the
Irish government is the principal actor involved in transforming a
public service model of water provision into a commercial semi-
state company that can attract the interests of institutional in-
vestors. This is corroborated by OECD reports:
Finally, the boundaries between the public and private sectors
have been blurred and the controversial nature of the debate on
PSP has abated somewhat, with more dialogue going on at
sector level and the recognition that a number of reforms are
required regardless of ownership. In that context, market-based
finance can potentially make a significant contribution to
bridging the financing gap in the water sector, for private and
public water service providers alike” (OECD, 2010: 22).
As Minister Alan Kelly made clear, the main reason for estab-
lishing Irish Water was to open up new ways of financing the
capital-intensive infrastructure upgrades required by Ireland's
water system. Faced with the fiscal constraints on government
expenditure and borrowing the first step involved in this process is
to get the cost of water services off the general balance-sheet. This7 It is important to distinguish between sources of funding for infrastructure
projects and the financing of such projects. As O'Brien and Pike outline, “[t]he
funding sources for infrastructure are relatively few, and tend to be derived from
taxation, user fees or other charges. Financing refers to the financial models that
organize how the revenue (or funding) sources are turned into capital” (2015: 3). In
other words, financing requires turning sources of funding (for example, water
charges) into a mechanism (financial product) for borrowing money for capital
investment in the present.
8 Kate Bayliss makes the relatively obvious but important point that framing the
provision of basic services (like water) in terms of the ‘financial gap’ ignores or
marginalizes other ways of approaching the problem. It also succeeds in mobilizing
governments, non-governmental and private financial institutions to design new
ways of accessing finance which generates new financial instruments, techniques
and opportunities for financial accumulation.
9 Kate Bayliss suggests this kind of trajectory when she writes: “Privatization also
lays the groundwork for financialization by transforming a public service into a
tradeable asset”.
10 In 2014 the National Treasury Management Agency Act was passed. This
established the V6.8 billion Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF) and gave the
NewEra Project a statutory footing. The ISIF and NewERA are complementary
strategies to assist the development and implementation of government plans for
investment in energy, water and next-generation telecommunications.move towards off-balance sheet service provision has also been
emerging in other sectors. Indeed, the reform of the Irish water
sector is part of broader program of re-structuring in the infra-
structure sector (DPER, 2011).10 The rationale is that by re-
structuring the sector around a series of streamlined, semi-state
companies that require relatively small amounts of initial seed in-
vestment, these companies will then be able to secure their own
sources of revenue from charges and from independent borrowing.
This will ensure that expenditure and potential borrowing for these
services and their expansion will not count towards the govern-
ment's deficit or debt figures.
In 2011, the consultancy firm Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC)
released an interim report on the setting up of a new state water
utility in Ireland. Their findings were based on the particular
challenges of the Irish context as well as the best evidence from
international experience (including Scotland, England, Wales,
Northern Ireland, Germany, France, Netherlands, South Africa,
Australia, and Bulgaria). While the setting up of an off-balance
sheet, self-financing water company had already been decided by
the Irish government (under pressure from the EU/IMF), PWC was
hired to identify the optimal utility model for achieving this goal.
The choice was between a Public Utility Model and an Agency
Model. In brief, the former describes an independent, self-funding
utility responsible for operation, maintenance and investment in
all water services infrastructure, customer billing and charging. The
latter is a company mainly charged with investment in the sector
with local authorities operating as agents of the company, retaining
their operational responsibilities and delivering smaller scale
investment.
The PWC report begins by reinforcing the financial and infra-
structural challenges Ireland faces. It states clearly that the scale of
financial investment required will not be met by domestic water
charges alone, meaning the utility will have to raise “significant
levels of external funding” (PWC 2011). The challenge of raising this
external private finance coupled with the need to consolidatewater
services in order to ensure strategic, risk-based investment and
compliance with environmental directives determines their
conclusion on the type of utility model required:
Optimal external funding is based on the ‘investment grade’ of
individual companies, which is driven by the size of the orga-
nisation, the focus and experience of the management team, the
stability and efficiency of back office and frontline operational
execution and for regulated entities, the ability to comply effi-
ciently and effectively with economic and environmental reg-
ulatory requirements. In addition, since the level of external
funding available is normally based on earnings, the extent to
which operating costs are reduced through the rationalisation,
consolidation and simplification of the delivery model increases
the level of borrowings available to the company. Consequently,
the ability to optimise the level of external funding is best
achieved by a single water company, with authority to centrally
manage the delivery of water services in Ireland (2011: 12; my
italics).
In 2013, the Irish government issued the Water Services Bill,
establishing Irish Water as the new state water utility responsible
for the operation, maintenance and improvement of all water ser-
vices infrastructure, customer billing and charging. Following the
advice of the PWC report, all water assets, liabilities and re-
sponsibilities were transferred from the 34 local water services
authorities to the new independent company. On the 1st January
2014, Irish Water officially took over responsibility for the Irish
water network. A twelve-year transition period has been set during
which the new utility will operate service level agreements with
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out. This decision was made despite a near unanimous response
from local authorities, including Dublin City Council, asserting that
the removal of responsibility from local authorities would
adversely affect local democracy and accountability and potentially
results in adverse effects on the quality of the service itself (DCC,
2012; GCC, 2012; CCC, 2012). The submissions from the local au-
thorities during the consultation process called for the Agency
Model to be used instead, with Irish Water overseeing the intro-
duction of water charges, metering and the raising of finance.
Since taking over the Irish water network in 2014 the challenge
for Irish Water has been to wean itself off government financial
support, establish a stable revenue stream from household charges
and demonstrate to potential external investors that it is an effi-
cient, low-risk investment opportunity.11 As can be expected this
process of financial engineering is both uncertain and contested. To
begin with, the government and Irish Water must have the utility
officially taken off the general balance sheet. To achieve this Irish
Water must pass the EuroStat ‘market corporation test’. This test is
carried out to prove that independent state companies or utilities
are operating within European competition regulations. This in-
volves two steps. First, the amount of money raised from user fees
or charges must “clearly exceed” payments from Government
funding. The second test is even tighter, requiring that the amount
collected from domestic and non-domestic charges must be equal
to 50 per cent of Irish Water's production costs, and should “clearly
exceed” this figure “as soon as possible”.
Initial financing from the government to IrishWater came in the
form of a V250 million commercial investment from the newly
established Irish Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF). This money has
gone towards the initial costs of setting up the new utility,
including the costs of consultants hired to advise on the organi-
zational and technological systems required for efficient,
compliant, self-financing water utility and the estimated V500
million required to install a national network of water meters. As
well as this capital investment, the government has continued to
provide annual subventions of on average V450 million a year
(from 2014 and due to run to the end of 2016) to the new utility for
the day-to-day running of water services. This is money that would
otherwise have gone to local authorities, and money that is largely
drawn from motor tax (Ryan, 2015). The plan had been to raise
V300 million from domestic customers in 2015, and V230 million
from non-domestic customers (Taylor, 2014b). However, significant
resistance to the introduction of water charges in 2014 forced the
government to reduce and guarantee a fixed level for water charges
until the end of 2018 (rendering the water meters and the incentive
to conserve redundant), as well as granting V100 water allowance
to every household.12 GivingV100 back to each household will cost
around V130 million next year - twice what was budgeted for
originally. The net amount of revenue to be collected through
household charges is now just V140 million, a fairly trivial amount
in the overall budget sums. This also assumes that over 90% of users11 For example, in its recent Water Services Strategic Plan (WSSP), the new utility
outlined an ambitious investment plan for the next twenty-five years. The plan
commits to spending V600 million a year on capital investment up to 2030, not
including the additional V500 m required for installing water meters throughout
the country. “In order for Irish Water to be able to raise significant finance at
favourable interest rates”, the WSSP states in the introduction, “it will be necessary
for it to demonstrate that it is an efficient water utility company, operating within a
stable regulatory framework, with secure revenue streams.” (Irish water, 2015 : xi; my
italics).
12 Under the 2014 Water Services Act, between January 2015 until 31 December
2018 the fixed charges for domestic water are set at a maximum charge for a single
adult home capped at V160 and the maximum charge for a multi adult home
capped at V260.will pay their bills. However, since the first bills were issued on the
1st April 2015 a strong campaign of non-payment, and continuing
uncertainty as to whether Irish Water will continue into the future,
has meant the percentage of people paying their bills has been less
than 50%.
In July of this year, Irish Water failed the Eurostat test. As well as
pointing to the excessive government control over the new utility,
the Eurostat report pointed out that “domestic consumers are to be
charged at significantly less than cost” for their water. While the
government was quick to claim this was only a “minor setback” and
that there were “inaccuracies” in the Eurostat report, it has already
passed amendments to the Water Services Act of 2014 designed to
ensure water users pay their charges in the future (Pollak, 2015).
These include a bill that puts responsibility on landlords to ensure
tenants pay their water charges, as well as a Civil Debt Bill that will
allow deductions from payments to a social welfare recipient, or
the attachment of earnings of employees for debts between V500
and V4000.
Publicly asserting that failing the Eurostat test means little in
terms of the overall strategy of Irish Water, the utility and gov-
ernment remain confident that households will pay their bills (in
the face of threats such as the Civil Debt Bill) and that the goal of
accessing capital on financial markets will be possible by
2018e2019. Until then, Irish Water will have to continue securing
bilateral loans from commercial banks. To date it has borrowed V1
billion through such loans. In early 2015, the utility secured its first
commercial loan from Ulster Bank (a two-year loan worth V100
million) (Hennessy, 2013). This loan was secured by a government
guarantee meaning that the debt is counted as part of the general
exchequer debt (Taylor, 2014a). However, Irish Water is also in the
process of negotiating further bilateral loans with international
commercial banks that are not likely to be guaranteed by the Irish
state (Molloy, 2015). These short-term loans are likely to be tem-
porary financial steps to ensure the utility can pass the Eurostat test
until revenue from water charges begins flowing in and longer-
term loans can be secured.
While Irish Water currently borrows from commercial banks,
the ultimate goal is to be in a situation where it can borrow larger
amounts of money for long-term infrastructure projects: in its most
recent seven year plan it states that by 2021 V5 billion will have
been invested with V2 billion arising from domestic and non-
domestic charges and the remaining V3 billion coming from capi-
tal markets. While it has not stipulated what kind of financial ar-
rangements this will involve it is likely to involve the issuing of
bonds that are secured against future revenues from water
charges.13 These bonds are different to commercial loans in that
they are financial products or assets that can then be traded on
secondary markets. Infrastructure bonds have become more pop-
ular following the GFC because they promise low-risk, high-yield,
inflation-proof investments to long-term investors, such as Pension
Funds (Courtois, 2013; Della Croce and Yermo, 2013; Drummer,
2011). Bearing this in mind, it is important to consider how the
goal of establishing an independent self-financing water utility has
shaped a broader set of decisions taken over the past four or five
years regarding the management of the new utility.
3.2. Improving performance: the modernization of the Irish Water
system
When setting up Irish Water in 2012, the government took the13 Other Irish semi-state utilities, including Bord Gais Eireann, a management
partner of Irish Water, have issued five-year bonds in the recent past as the practice
and market for infrastructure bonds has expanded.
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company, Bord Gais.14 While Irish Water will operate as a sepa-
rate, independent company from Bord Gais, it was considered
important that there be a ‘Management Partner’ with expertise in
the management of a major national utility e in this case the gas
and energy sector. As with the decision to establish a single,
centralized utility for water services, the rationale behind choosing
Bord Gais as a management partner was to alleviate risk and help
Irish Water avail of key expertise in raising finance,15 operating as a
utility in a regulated environment, and adopting effective man-
agement practices in the areas of customer relations, network
management and metering and utility operation systems (Irish
Water 2014).
When Bord Gais was given the contract to establish Irish Water
they received V180 million from the government's National
Reserve Pension Fund (now Irish Strategic Investment Fund) to
establish the new utility. V100 million was spent on new man-
agement systems and V85 million on fees for external consultancy
services.16 In 2014, the Public Accounts Committee17 was given a
rare opportunity to question Bord Gais (since Ervia) on these costs.
The representative for Ervia defended them on the basis that they
were needed to bring the Irish water system into the twenty-first
century. “Our ambitions as a company are to build out a high per-
forming modern utility”, he said, “the hallmarks of which are a
focus on cost savings and efficient operations, quality customer
service, and delivery of capital investments to time, to quality and
to budget” (Irish Water 2014). In order to achieve these goals, In-
formation Management Systems are required that will be sup-
ported by state of the art ICT systems. These developments are
considered an essential ingredient in the overall vision of Irish
Water: to become a self-financing, compliant and resource-efficient
water utility. There are two main areas where these new infor-
mation management systems are being implemented.
The first area is the water network itself. This responds to the
perceived inadequacy of the previous, fragmented approach to
water management carried out by local authorities “without con-
sistency of policy, uniformity of standards or risk metrics” (Irish
Water 2014). In part this is a response to demands from the Euro-
pean Commission for member states to more appropriately value
natural resources, such as water, and the various services it per-
forms within the economy and ecosystems (The European Envi-
ronment 2015). If we take the European objective of having ‘good
status’ in all watercourses and supplies by 2015 (extended now to
2020), we can begin to see that such benign-sounding re-
quirements do not just put financial pressure on states to comply
but rather demand new ways of assessing and managing the14 Bord Gais has now changed its name to Ervia after selling part of its operations
to the private company, UK based energy company Centrica.
15 For example, Bord Gais Eireann (BGE, a subsidiary of Ervia) recently managed to
raise finance that was guaranteed through a deal with a Danish export credit
agency. The money was to buy equipment for several new wind farms from Danish
companies. BGE also has experience in issuing infrastructure bonds (Corcoran,
2013).
16 The largest recipient was IBM (V44.8 m), who designed, delivered and inte-
grated all roles, business processes, systems and data required to enable Customer
Capability, Work and Asset Management capability and Support services; Accenture
(V17.2 m) who provided Programme Management across the Business Capability
areas of Irish Water; Ernst & Young (V4.6 m) who provided project design for each
project in the areas of Finance, Governance and Regulation, facilities and Customer
engagement; and KPMG (V2.2 m) who provided Quality Assurance Services on the
operation and deliverables on the programme to Senior Executives and the Board of
Irish Water (Submission Irish Water 2014).
17 The Public Accounts Committee is the public spending watchdog. It is designed
to ensure that there is accountability and transparency in the way Government
agencies allocate, spend and manage their finances and in guaranteeing that the
taxpayer receives value for money.performance of water resources, including rivers, lakes, ground-
water, and coastal waters. At the same time an asset-based
approach to water management promises significant cost-savings
and efficiencies. Irish Water draws on international benchmarks
in this area that suggest efficiencies of up to 40% are achievable in
capital investment if “the right choices can be made and delivered
efficiently”. Efficient in this sense does not justmean reducing labor
costs but reducing energy use, water loss and water consumption
through the adoption of new technological and managerial in-
novations. In order to bring about such improvements it is critical
that there be centralized strategic planning based on “accurate
asset performance data and full control of all investment decisions,
both capital and operational” (Irish Water 2014). Irish Water have
thus invested heavily in the creation of an asset management sys-
tem that will be capable of collecting and maintaining information
on the condition and performance of all assets in thewater network
e including treatment plants, leakages, pressure in the pipes and
household usage. This systemwill produce a central repository for a
huge range of data on assets that in turnwill become “the driver for
risk based decision making for the capital investment plan”. In-
vestments in the water network will be optimized and, crucially,
the utility will be able to prove to customers, regulators and po-
tential investors “that every euro we spend on the asset base de-
livers a maximum return”. Irish Water is thus seeking to “embed
the Asset Management culture across all of [their] activities in order
to optimize the performance of assets, through appropriate oper-
ation processes, maintenance and replacement regimes and per-
formance monitoring”.
As well as having to account for the V11 billion worth of ma-
terial assets, Irish Water also needs to ensure a secure stream of
revenue from household charges. All government funding to the
new utility is expected to come to an end by 2020, meaning that the
financing of operational and capital costs will depend on domestic
and commercial charges and the ability to borrow from institu-
tional investors. Irish Water has already embarked on one of the
most ambitious water metering programs of any water utility
worldwide. While this follows the user-pays principle and is
anticipated to reduce water demand through household manage-
ment, the meters also provide detailed information on customer
demand (Torrance, 2008). The metering project is costing Irish
Water an estimated V500 million and has been met with strong
resistance from communities around Ireland. One of the conse-
quences, as stated earlier, has been a decision to charge a flat, fixed
rate until the end of 2018. The government and Irish Water
continue to defend the metering scheme however as a long-term
investment in line with modern water utilities around the world.
These management information systems are expected to ensure
cost savings of a minimum of V2 billion for the exchequer by 2021.
By then the utility is also expected to be self-financing on the basis
of water charges and external funding. Borrowing capacity for the
utility will increase as the utility is able to prove predictable rev-
enues and efficient, cost-effective asset management: the Price
Waterhouse Cooper report estimated the debt capacity of the
business could rise from V606 million in 2015 to potentially V2.9
billion by 2030 partly on the basis of such efficiency measures. This
financial investment will in turn allow IrishWater to better address
the most pressing water quality problems and comply with Euro-
pean directives. In a recent interview Michael McNicholas, CEO of
Irish Water, reinforced this intimate relationship between access to
flows of finance and the modernization of the water system when
he said: “[a]s we drive efficiencies wewill have greater capacities to
go to the borrowing markets” (Rte 2015). The new asset manage-
ment and customer information systems are understood to be
necessary and crucial components of this relationship, enabling
continuous monitoring and improvement within an increasingly
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There has been a considerable body of literature examining the
expansion of neoliberal auditing technologies and techniques in
both the private and public sector over the past three decades
(Burchell, 1996; Dardot and Laval, 2013; De Angelis and Harvie,
2009; Strathern, 2000). This work traces the development of in-
struments of assessment and evaluation to all manner of social and
environmental activity (work, education, health care). The
reasoning behind this culture of evaluation is that disparate sub-
jects, assets and activities can be compared and assessed over time
inciting innovation and improved performance. This has become
most obvious in the work place where individual activity is subject
to forms of measurement and evaluation in order to improve per-
formance and productivity. These kinds of internal, work man-
agement practices have now migrated to the public sector and are
identified in the literature on New Public Management and cor-
poratization (McDonald, 2014).18 Interestingly, similar forms of
neoliberal governance are now being applied in the fields of envi-
ronmental conservation and ecosystems services: bymeasuring the
value of diverse, situated non-human actors and relationships these
'externalities' are not only accounted for but also rendered
commensurate through a common apparatus of measuring tech-
niques and technologies (Büscher et al. 2012; Brockington, 2011;
Robertson, 2006; Sullivan, 2013). As Sian Sullivan writes, “map-
ping, measuring and monetisation techniques are thus deployed to
produce comprehensive ecosystem services catalogues, applicable
from local to global scales” (Sullivan, 2013: 205). This work points
to a transformation in what ‘nature’ becomes within ecological
modernization: no longer a raw material input or ‘externality’
metabolized within the production process, but a performing asset
that can be measured, evaluated, compared and potentially traded
with other assets within highly technical networks.
While this literature focuses on the agendas around Natural
Capital Accounting and the techno-scientific work required to
assign measurable, economic values to situated and complex
ecologies (rivers, soil, forests), it is productive to extend this anal-
ysis to the transformations currently underway in the making-
visible of core infrastructures like water. Just as payments for eco-
systems services (PES), for example, attempt to measure and thus
abstract distinct parts and processes of non-human nature, so too
are instruments of measurement emerging that (supposedly)
represent the financial and ecological value of entire in-
frastructures. The growing imperative for water utilities (private or
public) to access finance directly through global financial markets
and to modernize aging infrastructures to meet the exacting and
highly technical standards of environmental regulations is driving
the need for these new systems of measurement and evaluation.
This has not only opened new areas for technological innovation
but also for profit as the process of translating the previously
‘invisible', inefficient water network into a fully accounted-for and
high-performing infrastructure asset gets underway.19 In the case
of Irish Water this includes, for example, measuring and demon-
strating the quality of the water resources, the pressure in the
pipes, the energy consumption of the treatment plants and, of
course, the future revenues to be generated from water charges.18 Irish Water is no different in this regard, having established a pay model in
which a portion of individual salaries is deliberately set at risk - if targets are not
hit, the employee loses out on that segment of their salary.
19 This is evident in the recent, dramatic shift in the business profile of Veolia, one
of the best-known global private water companies. In a recent report, the company
signaled both the growing financial restrictions on governments and the increas-
ingly demanding ecological requirements in parts of the Global North as proof that
there would be growing demand for environmental services and ‘value-added so-
lutions’ to water, waste and energy management.Irish Water claims that this information and the asset-based sys-
tems of management underlying it are needed to rationalize and
modernize the water system. But the informational value that is
extracted from thewater system is not neutral or universal. There is
always a disparity between the measurement of an activity and the
existence of other qualities and values associated with that activity
that are excluded by the instruments of measurement (De Angelis
and Harvie, 2009). The reality is that this move is driven by the
need to comply with highly technical European environmental
standards and, perhaps more significantly, the demands of global
financial investors (Inderst, 2009; Turner, 2014). It is this impera-
tive e to translate the Irish water system into the legible, economic
terms of bio-financial value e that characterizes the process of bio-
financialization (Lilley and Papadopoulos 2014).
4. Conclusion
In their recent article, ‘Banking Spatially on the Future: Capital
Switching, Infrastructure, and the Ecological Fix’ (2015), Noel Cas-
tree and Brett Christophers make an important analytic connection
between the climate crisis and the financial crisis. They focus their
attention on the unprecedented and capital-intensive infrastruc-
ture projects (from housing to road to energy and water provision)
that will be required as the effects of climate change intensify. They
also see how such investments can provide a positive and socially
progressive response to the current financial (and more broadly,
economic) crisis by drawing some of the vast reserves of financial
capital away from speculative, short-term investments into more
productive, sustainable and long-term investments that benefit
society at large. This argument fits within a more general call for a
‘green’ New Deal, and more specifically a body of literature that has
been examining ongoing changes in the governance and financing
of core infrastructure that move beyond the impasse of the public-
private binary (Allen and Pryke, 2013; O'Neill, 2010, 2015). For
Castree and Christophers, the objective of national governments
and policy-makers should be to find ways of attracting financial
investment into infrastructure, thereby linking the flows of finan-
cial capital with the flows of vital resources necessary for social and
ecological reproduction. In this paper, I have sought to show that
something like this process is happening in the context of Irish
Water: in an effort to harness external sources of finance to
modernize the Irish water infrastructure new relations are
emerging between financial markets, the state, the Irish population
and the water network itself. This unstable arrangement does not,
however, tend towards more progressive hydro-social futures.
Rather it represents new advances in the neoliberalization of vital
services. I want to conclude by emphasizing three points in this
regard.
First, rather than emphasizing geographic and historical varia-
tions in how neoliberalism manifests itself, I want to point to what
remains consistent to neoliberalism in all its protean forms: the
guiding logic of competition as the basis for good government. In
response to financial and environmental challenges, the Irish gov-
ernment has established Irish Water as an instrument for demon-
strating and thus comparing both the financial and environmental
performance of thewater infrastructure as awhole; it is this logic of
evaluation and comparison that is assumed to drive efficiencies.
Irish Water represents important and novel steps in the process of
bio-financial engineering through which more and more aspects of
the hydro-social cycle become measurable and thus legible within
globalized financial and regulatory domains. It is also important to
note that what is becoming valuable here is not the use-value of
Ireland's water resources or existing infrastructure but their future
value as performing assets. In this way, an entire water infra-
structure is translated into “a speculative opportunity like any other
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consequence of this is the central role that such technologies and
techniques of measurement will play in the future (and already do)
as they mediate and represent the value of the water network and
the comparative performances of the utility and of individual
households. While it is too early to tell what the consequences of
this will be it is clear that the overlaying of new instruments and
systems of valuation onto social and ecological activities and pro-
cesses are not external or secondary to the activities themselves
(Pellizzoni, 2011). The most obvious example is the system of water
metering. Defended by the government, Irish Water and many
environmental groups as away of incentivizing water conservation,
this type of auditing technology reflects just one moment in the
more general extension of value-measurement that will change
how people relate to and value water. While individualizing re-
sponsibility for water conservation provokes justified resistance,
the wider issue is that once value is imbued in the appearance of an
activity rather than the activity itself a ‘short-circuiting’ can take
place, and the disparity between complex socio-material realities
and a set of representations circulating as environmental data
within new (largely unaccountable) techno-managerial systems
will become more pronounced.
Second, the case of Irish Water departs in important ways from
an understanding of neoliberalism that emphasizes the ‘retreat’ of
the state and the ‘advance’ of the market. The main protagonist in
the process of bio-financialization has been the Irish statee passing
a Water Services Act that consolidates all water services and re-
sponsibilities into one, centralized utility; providing the necessary
finance to establish the new utility and a state guarantee of up to
V2 billion for borrowings by Irish Water; potentially enacting
legislation that will allow unpaid charges to be subtracted from
wages and social payments. The scale of reform required to turn a
water utility such as Irish Water into an ‘investment grade’ asset
requires significant and ongoing intervention. Once we recognize
this we can begin to decipher the key role of the state in enabling
the growing financialization of infrastructure e the financial
enclosure of public goods, the shift from public utility to financial
product (O'Neill, 2015). In this sense, there is a clear need to be
critical of the perceived ‘public’ re-orientation of water services in a
context where the state itself becomes the central agent in effec-
tively securing new revenue streams/financial assets for private
financial investors (O'Brien and Pike, 2015).
Finally, the establishment of Irish Water has provoked by far the
largest and most significant mobilization of people since the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 and the austerity policies implemented after
2010. The main target of opposition has been the introduction of
water charges. These are rightly seen as regressive and an unfair
burden on many people after five years of austerity. Grassroots
opposition to the installation of water meters and widespread
criticism of the lack of transparency and accountability displayed
by Irish Water also reflect a popular understanding that public
management of water services is about more than just who pays for
it. In a context where the financial viability of the new utility relies
on the disciplining of water users as reliable new sources of reve-
nue and the consolidation of the water network within one, highly
technical entity, it is clear that ongoing forms of resistance will
provide an effective obstacle to the re-organization of the Irish
water system. A likely consequence will be an inability to access
external sources of finance for the upgrading of the water system20 The Right2Water Campaign is a public campaign by activists, citizens, com-
munity groups, political parties/individuals and trade unionists who are calling for
the Government to recognise and legislate for access to water as a human right and
to stop the introduction of water charges.through the issuing of bonds e ongoing uncertainty around the
future of the new semi-state company is a red flag for potential
investors. Currently, organizers of the Right2Water Campaign20
remain focused on reversing the water charges, abolishing Irish
Water and returning to the previous model of financing water
services through general taxation. However, this position does not
appear to grasp the globalized and financialized character of the
economy, nor does it have much to say about how a twenty first
century infrastructure might actually be organized in a way that
reflects new environmental demands and technical possibilities. As
Castree and Christophers’ proposal outlines, it is necessary to
engage with the possibilities and potential for new ways of
financing and governing vital infrastructures that neither rely on a
nostalgic return to the past, nor the opaque, uneven financial ar-
rangements and highly technical alternative that appears to be
unfolding in the case of Irish Water.
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